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Introduction
The International Labor Standards (ILS) movement is meant to be an initiative to promote better working conditions and higher living standards for
workers in the Third World. It therefore seems baffling that the most vociferous opposition to ILS comes from the Third World, and not just from
elite groups and government, but also from workers and grass roots activists. However, this opinion from the South, encountered all over developing countries gets little representation in international forums and global
meetings. Is the dissent from the South based on the South's misperception of its own interests? Or is it founded on a realistic perception of global
politics and power? The purpose of this essay is to argue the latter-that
the Southern apprehension is understandable and to ignore this while
drafting policy for the well-being of the workers will not only be an injustice, but it will give rise to global tensions and instability.
The contemporary world has seen a bewildering number of initiatives
for ILS, the latest being the UN's Global Compact, which attempts to make
big firms and corporations join hands in a voluntary contract to adhere to
certain minimal labor standards. This stands in contrast to the effort of
the International Labor Organization (ILO) to make nations ratify 'conventions,' which then require them to enforce minimal labor standards within
their national boundaries; and in even sharper contrast to the proposed
plan to introduce a 'social clause' in the World Trade Organization (WTO)
agreements, which would allow the international community to place trade
sanctions on countries that violated minimal labor standards.
f This article originated at the Cornell InternationalLaw Journal 2001 symposium.
* Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and Carl Marks Professor of International Studies and Professor of
Economics, Department of Economics, Cornell University. Ph.D., M.Sc. (Econ.) London
School of Economics; B.A. (Hons.) St. Stephen's College, Delhi.
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This paper will argue that, on the whole, the existing ILS initiatives are
ill-conceived and likely to have undesirable fall-outs. This is true even
though global opinion has become more sophisticated and nuanced in
recent years and some of the more recent proposals, such as the UN Global
Compact, are better than some earlier plans. For any ILS effort to succeed
and to actually help those it is meant to help, it is imperative to take
account of the opinions of developing nations. Accordingly, the paper
ends with a discussion of global democracy.
In summary, it is argued that at this stage ILS is best left to individual
nations and only a minimal global coordination, and, further, that this
global coordination is best done through the ILO and the UN. The WTO,
the way it currently functions, is not the appropriate body for enforcing
labor standards. In the long run, there must be an effort to democratize
global organizations and institutions, such as the WTO. Only when that is
done, or at least when the process is reasonably underway, can global organizations be seriously entrusted with the task of promoting higher international labor standards.
I. The Issues and the Historical Background
Most people, when they think of labor standards, think of the law as its
natural hand-maiden. If workers are to be better off, avoid excessively hazardous work, keep their children out of the workplace, and so on, our natural tendency is to think of the law as the natural instrument for achieving
these. Thus we may think of direct laws (such as minimum wage legislation and the legal prohibition of child labor) and indirect laws, which
enhance worker power (such as the right to bargain collectively) as essential instruments for raising worker welfare.
A large part of mainstream economics is a warning that this kind of
reasoning is faulty. It reminds us that the absence of government action
does not necessarily mean that labor standards will remain low. As productivity and the demand for labor rise, workers can achieve higher living
standards through the forces of the market. The mere threat that a worker
may quit his or her job could ensure that he or she will be paid well and
not be exposed to excessive risks, made to work excessive hours, and so on.
Of course, some economists go overboard and argue that the well-being of
the worker can be left entirely to market forces.
In reality, there are two broad reasons why interventions may be called
for. First, markets often fail because of externalities, asymmetric information, or the difficulties of monitoring, and we may need laws to correct for
these failures. And even when markets do not fail, the market outcome
may be more inequitable than we are willing to tolerate. Second, even
when each nation prefers a higher labor standard this may be impossible to
achieve unless several nations coordinate their behavior. When this happens, not only do governments immediately come into play, but the need
arises for an internationally coordinated effort. The subject of Interna-
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tional Labor Standards pertains to this second kind of intervention.'
The historical roots of the labor standards movement go far back into
history, beginning with Sir Robert Peel's introduction of the English Factory Act of 1802, which is now treated as a landmark. The problem of
inter-country coordination in the context of labor standards dates back to
1818, and in particular to the writings of Robert Owen, which were soon
2
followed by the advocacy of numerous French intellectuals and activists.
Awareness of the inter-regional nature of the labor standards problem
increased through the nineteenth century and early twentieth century as
the federal government of the United States battled to curb inter-state competition and adopt common labor standards. 3 The U.S. historical experience nicely mirrors the current global problems.
In the U.S. the first child-labor legislation was enacted by the state of
Massachusetts in 1837. Thereafter, different states brought in different legislation, often backing down for fear that firms and capital would leave and
go to states where labor laws were more lax. Some of this history is nicely
recounted by Florence Kelley. 4 The openness of this inter-government
competition is transparent from the following account in her book:
For lack of uniformity, progress has been hindered in many states, notably
in the glass industry which, during 1904, successfully represented to the
legislature of New Jersey that, if deprived of the privilege of employing boys
under the age of sixteen years at night, it would migrate
to Delaware and
5
West Virginia, where no such restrictions yet await it.
The inter-state competition came to an end as recently as 1938 with
the passing of the first nationwide law in the U.S. to monitor labor stan6
dards-the Fair Labor Standards Act.
After the Second World War, and especially in the last one or two
decades, as the process of globalization gathered momentum and labor and
capital, began to move more freely across nations, the labor standards concern spilled beyond national and regional boundaries and became properly an international matter. Ever since the formation of the International
Labor Organization (ILO) in 1919 there has been a forum for these international concerns. But for a long time the ILO was an ineffective body, with
some doubts about its survival. Initially it had only 44 member nations.
1. This view of ILS is explicit in Kaushik Basu, International Labor Standardsand
Child Labor, 42 CHALLENGE 80, 89 (1999); NANcY H. CHAU & RAvi KANBUR, THE RACE TO
THE BoTroM, FROM THE BOTTOM (Cornell University, CEPR Working Paper No. 2687,
2000), available at http://www.arts.cornell.edu/poverty/Kanbur/ck15.pdf.
2. See Stanley Engerman, The History and Political Economy of International Labor
Standards, mimeo: Rochester University (2001), available at http://www.egdi/gov.se/
pdf/study/studyl.pdf; see also Steve Charnovitz, The Influence of International Labour
Standards on the World Trading Regime: A HistoricalOverview, 126 INTL. LAB. REv. 565

(1987).
3. See FLORENCE KELLEY, SOME ETHIcAL GAINS THROUGH LEGISLATION 3-104 (1905).
4. See id.; see also Carolyn M. Moehling, State Child Labor Laws and the Decline of
Child Labor, 36 ExPLORATIONS ECON. HisT. 72, 74-78 (1999).
5. Kelley, supra note 3, at 91.
6. Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade Liberalisation and 'Fair Trade' Demands: Addressing the
Environmental and Labour Standards Issues, 18 WORLD ECON. 745 (1995).
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Membership grew slowly until 1946 when the ILO became an agency of the
United Nations, and its membership grew rapidly thereafter. By 1969 it
7
had 174 members.
The globalization of these concerns led to the codification of labor
standards. The standards were classified under four kinds of "rights": (1)
Basic Rights, which included the right against involuntary servitude and
injunctions against exploitative child labor and discrimination; (2) Civic
Rights, which gave workers the freedom of association and collective bargaining rights; (3) Survival Rights, which ensured a minimum wage, accident compensation, and the right not to be exposed to excessive hazards;
and (4) Security Rights, which placed restrictions on employers from firing
workers and gave workers the right to retirement benefits. 8
Resisting the tendency for proliferating labor standards and recognizing that if the same standards are to be imposed on all regions, from subSaharan Africa to Western Europe, the requirements have to be fairly minimal, there has now emerged what is often referred to as the list of 'core
labor standards.' 9 These consist of (1) prohibition of forced labor, (2) prohibition of discrimination in employment, (3) right to freedom of association, (4) right to bargain collectively, and (5) prohibition of exploitative
child labor. 10
While the core labor standards are much more reasonable and realistic, the crux of the matter is not the agreement, in the abstract, of the
importance of these minimal standards-most reasonable people will
accept these-but the practical interpretation of these precepts and the
methods used to implement them.
II. Existing Initiatives and Their Shortcomings
There are two broad classes of global actions that have been used thus far
to promote higher ILS. Following my earlier usage," I shall call these
extra-nationaland supra-nationalactions.
Extra-national action is action taken by a nation within its own territory that creates incentives in other countries to improve ILS. An example
of an extra-national action is Harkin's Bill, more formally known as the
Child Labor Deterrence Act, which has, fortunately, remained a bill. 12 The
7. Engerman, supra note 2.
8. Alejandro Portes, When More Can be Less: Labor Standards, Development, and the
Informal Economy, in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LABOR STANDARDS AND DEVELOPMENT IN
THE GLOBAL EcONOMY 219 (1990); KEITH E. MASKUS, SHOULD CORE LABOR STANDARDS BE
IMPOSED THROUGH INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY? 4-7 (The World Bank, Development

Research Group, Policy Research Working Paper, 1997); Nirvikar Singh, The Impact of
InternationalLabor Standards:A Survey of Economic Theory, mimeo: University of California, Santa Cruz (2001), available at http://www.egdi.gov.se/pdf/study/study2.pdf.
9. For discussion, see Kenneth A. Swinnerton, An Essay on Economic Efficiency and
Core Labour Standards, 20 WORLD ECON. 73, 76-84 (1997).
10. Id.
11. Kaushik Basu, Child Labor: Cause, Consequence, and Cure, with Remarks on International Labor Standards,37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1083 (1999).

12. S. 613, 103rd Cong. (1993).
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aim of this bill was to enable the United States to put a ban on any import
that has a child labor input. The law works within the United States but
creates incentives in other nations to keep children out of the labor force
because nations who do not do so will be prohibited from exporting to the
United States. One can go further and argue that children should be
empowered as actors in the process of decision-making concerning their
13
own rights.
The weakness of the bill is its failure to recognize that (1) parents do
not typically send their children to work out of sloth but out of desperation, and (2) it is possible for children to suffer a worse fate than labor,
such as starvation. In the poorest nations an abrupt halt to child labor is
likely to cause children to suffer acute poverty and hunger. 14 Clearly, we
must not be so single-minded in eradicating child labor that we are prepared to do so by making children starve. Additionally, this kind of extranational action is likely to drive children away from the export sector to
other sectors, which may be worse for the children's welfare. There is now
mounting evidence from Nepal's carpet industry and Bangladesh's garment industry that the anticipation of legislative and other punitive actions
by industrialized nations has driven children away from labor to
prostitution.15

The trouble with such bills is that even if they are inspired by a genuine concern for workers in the South, as they often are, they enable protectionism in the North. Interestingly, while the current versions of the
Harkin's bill appeal only to the welfare of the child in motivating the legislation, the early versions of the bill had open reference to the fact that child
labor in the Third World may cause unemployment in the North. 16 An
implication of the analysis in this paper is that more effective solutions
would attack child labor at a nationwide level, rather than in the exports
7
sector alone.1
13. This is argued by Jo BOYDEN & DEBORAH LEVINSON, CHILDREN AS ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL ACTORS IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS (EGDI Working Paper No. 1, 2000), available at http://www.edgi.gov.se/pdf/workpaper.pdf.
14. There is a lot of evidence that it is poverty that drives households to send their
children to work. For cross-country evidence, see Alan Krueger, International Labor
Standards and Trade, in THE WORLD BANK, ANNuAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEvELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1996 (Michael Bruno & Boris Pleskovic eds., 1997). And for evi-

dence based on inter-temporal micro data, see Eric Edmonds, Will Child Labor Decline
with Improvements in Living Standards?, mimeo: Dartmouth College, available at http://
www.dartmouth.edu/-eedmonds/vnivc.pdf, and see also infra note 29.
15. See UNICEF, Girls in Especially Difficult Circumstances: An Action Report, Kathmandu: UNICEF; Drusila Brown et al., US Trade and other Policy Options and Programs to
Deter Foreign Exploitation of Child Labor (University of Michigan, Discussion Paper No.
433, 1999), available at http://www.spp.umich.edu/RSIE/workingpapers/wp.html.
16. A superior extra-national legal action is the Sander's Amendment of the Tariff
Act of 1930, which seeks to ban imports of goods that use forced child labor. This move
towards distinguishing between different forms of child labor is a move in the right
direction.
17. See Kaushik Basu & Pham Hoang Van, The Economics of Child Labor, 88 Am.
ECON. REV. 412 (1998).
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A supra-national action is an action undertaken by a collectivity of
nations to sanction against the violation of minimal labor standards. Two
prominent examples of supra-national actions are the UN Global Compact
and the various ILO conventions. In the case of the Global compact, companies voluntarily agree to abjure certain practices. In the case of the ILO
conventions, countries commit to adhere to certain standards. The important difference between these two voluntary schemes is that they place the
primary responsibility of ILS on different agencies. The Global Compact
places the responsibility on multinationals and big corporations while the
ILO conventions place the responsibility on the nations, and primarily the
Third World nations since these are the potential violators of the standards.
Perhaps the most potent form of supra-national action contemplated is
to have a social clause in the WTO provisions, which would allow the WTO
to impose trade sanctions on an erring country.' 8 The risk of empowering
the WTO thus is that this will become a powerful instrument of protectionism in the North. 19 Powerful lobbies may have already misused similar
well-meaning legislation. 20 An interesting case in point is the use of the1
2
Sander's Amendment against the Brazilian company Sucocitrico Cutrale.
The charge was that the company was using children to pluck oranges.
However, as the Wall Street Journal pointed out this was probably an act of
reprisal headed by the Teamsters Union against Cutrale for downsizing
22
some Minute Maid plants it had bought from Coca-Cola Co. in Florida.
The problem is not just that the power of the WTO will be misused,
but that, as things stand, it is likely to be used disproportionately by industrialized nations against developing countries simply because the latter do
not have the resources-money or expertise-to fight out cases in Geneva.
Hence, the across-the-board negative reaction of developing countries to the
idea of empowering the WTO seems to have some basis.
Faced with these criticisms, there is a groundswell of opinion in the
industrialized nations, at least among the intelligentsia, to use more informal, and therefore flexible, arrangements to raise labor standards. 23 What
18. Robert Staiger, The International Organization and Enforcement of Labor Standards, mimeo: University of Wisconsin, availableat http://www.egdi.gov.se/pdf/study/
study4.pdf.
19. Much has been written about the dangers of giving WTO the power to uphold
ILS. E.g.,Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade Liberalisationand 'FairTrade' Demands:Addressing the
Environmental and Labour Standards Issues, 18 WORLD EcoN. 745 (1995); see also T. N.
Srinivasan, International Trade and Labor Standards from an Economic Perspective, in
CHALLENGES TO THE NEW WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Pitou van DiJck & Gerrit Faber
eds., 1996).
20. Matt Moffett, Citrus Squeeze: U.S. Child-Labor Law Sparks a Trade Debate Over
Brazilian Oranges, WALL ST. J., September 9, 1998, at Al.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. For a very interesting suggestion of how to organize a flexible system, see Archon
Fung et al., Realizing Labor Standards: How Transparency, Competition, and Sanctions
Could Improve Working Conditions Worldwide, BOSTON REV., Feb./Mar. 2001, at 4. Their
scheme shares the spirit of the UN Global Compact in one respect-they both place the
primary responsibility for upholding standards on the corporations. However, the
scheme does have important flaws. See, e.g., Pranab Bardhan, Some Up, Some Down;
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has caught a lot of the liberal attention is the idea of 'product labeling,' that
is, to have stickers on 'suspect' goods that declare these goods are "child
labor free" or, more generally, produced under circumstances that meet a
minimal ILS. 24 Hence, the ultimate decision whether or not to boycott
such a product is left as a decision of individual consumers. In fact the UN
Global Compact is likely to have a very similar effect. By publicizing the
list of companies that are signatories to this compact it can create a sense
among consumers about which companies meet minimal labor standards
and consumers can then boycott the others or buy from them only when
there is a substantial price advantage.
Such informal schemes can be deeply unfair. There is, first of all, the
large question of whether moral judgements ought to be dispensed through
the markets. At first sight, this may appear to be an instance of consumer's
sovereignty. But a preference against a carpet that uses child labor is not
quite the same thing as one's preference for red apples or against green
apples. The former is intimately tied to the urge to sanction a certain kind
of behavior. It is a moral preference of a particular kind, which may be
called a "sanctioning preference."
While social sanctions do play important roles in civic life, it is not
obvious that they are always the right method for dispensing justice. And
there is good reason for this. When we express an interest in one good over
another as a form of our sanctioning preference, our aim is not just to
gratify a personal hedonism, but to punish or reward some people (for
instance, those involved in the production of a certain good who, in the
process, violate or adhere to certain standards). But what we really want is
that those who violate certain standards should be punished to a certain
degree, for instance, by losing a certain percentage of their business-say
40%. But there is no way for a single consumer to express this preference
in the market. If he boycotts the good in an effort to hurt the producer and
all those involved in the manufacture of a certain product, how does he
know that all other consumers will not do the same and so end up drying
up 100% of the business, instead of exactly 40%? Likewise, when a consumer decides to buy a particular brand name to reward the manufacturer
a certain amount, there is no way to ensure that the right amount of consumers will do the same and so the reward will be commensurate with the
good act. In brief, there is a huge coordination problem in the dispensing
of justice that cannot be solved by the atomistic decisions of thousands of
individual consumers.
Robin Broad, A Better Mousetrap?; Mark Levinson, Wishful Thinking, David Moberg,
Union and the State; Guy Standing, Human Development; Heather White, Educating
Worker, and Kaushik Basu, The View from the Tropics, in id.
24. For analyses of product labeling, see Drusilla K. Brown, A Transactions Cost Politics Analysis of InternationalChild Labor Standards,in SocIAL DiMENsIONS OF U.S. TRAD
POLICY (Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern eds., 2000); APNAB K. BASU E AL.., GuARANTEED MANUFACTURED wITHOUT CHILD LABOR (Department of Agricultural, Resource, and
Managerial Economics, Cornell University, Working Paper 2000-04, 2000); S.L. Bachman, The Political Economy of Child Labor and Its Impact on International Business, 35
Bus. EcON. 30 (2000).
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Hence, punishments dispensed through informal social sanctions
often turn out to be witch-hunts causing disproportionate pain to some
and too little pain to others. Not surprisingly, when it comes to justice,
most societies prefer to use a centralized, non-democratic system, namely,
that of the courts and the judiciary. The free market is not the right instrument for passing moral judgements.
More specifically, the method of product labeling has the disadvantage
of being too blunt an instrument. It treats all countries on par. Take, for
instance, child labor. Some sub-Saharan African countries, such as Ethiopia, have a huge dependence on child labor, with close to 45% of all children in the age group 10 to 14 years working. On the other hand, in most
Asian countries, including China and India, the participation rates are
much lower (respectively 11% and 14%).25 If consumers in industrialized
nations begin to totally boycott goods with a child-labor input, it is arguable that some of these countries where the participation rates are low will
suffer, but be able to withstand the boycott. On the other hand, for several
African countries and even some Asian and Latin American countries-the
poorer ones-there may be a major adverse impact on the economy, causing a disproportionate suffering for all, including the children, who were
meant to be protected by this action.
Additionally, this action is likely to be biased in favor of large manufacturers. Consider a small producer of soccer balls in Pakistan. For him
the production unit is likely to double up as factory shed and bedroom.
For such a producer to persuade a labeling agency that it does not use child
labor and so should get a label will be very hard, since the children are
never far away from the areas of production. On the other hand, a large
producer can centralize its production and prevent children from even
entering the factory. This is in fact exactly what Reebok International has
done in Sialkot, Pakistan.
Finally, these informal methods of product boycott share the problem
of extra-national action discussed above, which drive bad practices, such as
the use of child labor, from the export sector of developing countries to the
26
indigenous sectors where conditions are often worse.
What then are we to do to improve labor standards?
III. Recommendations
One general recommendation for upholding labor standards that economists make is the importance of keeping trade channels from the Third
World open. It is the greater demand for goods from the Third World that
translates into a higher demand for labor, which raises the bargaining
25. These and other statistics were compiled by the ILO in ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE
(International Labor Organization
CD-ROM, 1996).
26. For an interesting study in the context of Bangladesh of how global monitoring
can backfire, see NAILA KABEER, THE POWER TO CHOOSE: BANGLADESHI WOMEN AND LABOUR
POPUI.ATONS: ESTMATES AND PROJECTIONS, 1950-2010

MARKET DECISIONS IN LONDON AND DHARA (2000).
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power of workers. This argument has been made so many times 27 that
there is no reason to dwell on it beyond endorsement.
A related and more specific recommendation, in the context of child
labor, is for policies that improve conditions in the adult labor market.
While some early work held parents responsible for child labor, it was
argued in Basu and Van that a child's non-work is likely to be a luxury
good in a household's decision-making. 28 In other words, parents do not
like to send their children to work if they can help it; it is only when they
are driven by acute economic hardship that they send their children to
work. 2 9 This argument does not deny that there are exceptions in the form
of abusive parents who buy their own leisure by making their children
work and that other factors, such as the availability of decent schooling,
have a large influence on the incidence of child labor. But in general, when
child labor is a mass phenomenon, as in contemporary developing countries, it is wrong to equate child labor with child abuse. It follows that a
policy for eradicating child labor should treat the parent as an ally in this
task rather than an adversary. Hence, if we can intervene to reduce adult
unemployment and raise adult incomes, parents on their own will withdraw children from the labor market. There will be no need to use the stick
to achieve this. So, somewhat paradoxically, the one policy always worth
using to combat child labor is to improve the conditions of adult labor.
All these policy interventions through the market are desirable but will
clearly take a lot of time to implement. Even if we use them in the long run,
we have to think of more direct interventions in the short run. What
should these be? We have seen above how it is likely to be better to rely on
conventions such as the ones adopted by the ILO or compacts such as that
of the UN, rather than to use the social clause of the WTO. Yet even these
are not good enough. Nor is it a good idea to leave sanctions to the
consumers.
As things stand, the main agency for labor standards policy has to be
with the national governments, which can tailor the policy to each nation's
specific needs and context. Yet this alone is not enough, since labor stan27. E.g., Avinash Dixit, Comment on A TransactionsCost Politics Analysis of International Child Labor Standards, in SociAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. TRADE POLIcY (Alan V.
Deardorff & Robert M. Stern eds., 2000); Saqib Jafarey & Sajal Lahiri, Will Trade Sanctions Reduce Child Labour? The Role of Credit Markets, mimeo: University of Essex.
28. See supra note 17; see also Swinnerton et al., The Economics of Child Labor: Comment, 89 Am. EcoN. REv. 1382 (1999). Very different kinds of problems arise with street
children, but unfortunately on this there are as yet few studies, an exception being William Myers, Alternative Services for Street Children: The Brazilian Approach, in COMBATTING CHILD LABOR (Assefa Bequele & Jo Boyden eds., 1988).
29. There is ample evidence for the luxury axiom. For empirical studies that shed
light on this axiom see, for instance, Ranjan Ray, Child Labor, Child Schooling, and Their
Interactionwith Adult Labor: Empirical Evidence for Peru and Pakistan, 14 WORLD BANK
ECON. REv. 347 (2000); Sonia Bhalotra, Is Child Work Necessary?, mimeo: University of
Cambridge (2000); Patrick Emerson & Andre Souza Portela, Is There a Child Labor Trap?

Inter-generationalPersistenceof Child Labor in Brazil, mimeo: Cornell University (2000),
available at http://econ.cudenver.edu/emerson/childlabor/pdf; Samuel Freije and Luis
F. Lopez-Calva, Child Labor, School Attendance, and Poverty in Mexico and Venezuela,
mimeo: Cornell University (2000).
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dards have an important inter-country dimension. The tension is not
between the North and the South but between the South and the South, as
argued in Basu (1999) and Kanbur and Chau (2000). 30 With globalization
it is now easier for capital to move from one country to another. It is only
natural that when one developing country contemplates raising a particular standard it has to worry that it may drive capital to another developing
country.
This was borne out quite strikingly when, because of political reasons,
the U.S. stopped importing carpets from Iran. With one developing country's exports cut off, another developing country took over the business. In
this case, India became the largest exporter to the U.S. It is this very fear
that exports will shift to another developing nation that ties the hands of
individual governments of developing countries from taking more action.
On the other hand, the chances of an export activity shifting from a developing nation to an industrialized nation because of the raising of labor
standards are negligible because the two types of nations have such widely
differing comparative advantages. There is therefore need for multi-country coordinated action, but the coordination has to be among the developing countries in their own collective interest.
Hence, we need a global organization to do the coordination. The difficulty stems from the fact that there is no organization that adequately
represents the opinion and interests of developing nations. A prerequisite
for handing over labor standards policy to an international organization is
the democratization of the organization. Indeed, the WTO, in principle,
could be an enforcer of ILS, if developing countries felt it represented their
interest adequately. So, though for now we do not have too many options,
other than relying on market-oriented policies, such as bolstering the
demand for adult labor in developing nations and keeping open trade channels, and for some effort by national governments, there has to be a major
effort to democratize international organizations, such as the WTO, so that
they can then be entrusted with the important task of crafting and implementing policies for better labor standards.
The democratization of international organizations is a large topic.
The concluding section of this essay is a brief incursion into this complicated subject.
IV. Restructuring International Organizations
One concomitant of globalization and technological progress that has
either gone unnoticed or been hushed up by those who did notice it is that
it has a natural corrosive effect on global democracy. As a consequence of
this phenomenon, even if individual countries become democratic, the
aggregate of global democracy may well be on the wane. Democracy
entails many things-the existence of a variety of political and legislative
institutions, avenues for citizens to participate in the formation of eco30. Basu, supra note 1; CHAu & KANBUR, supra note 1.
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nomic policies that affect their lives and, in the ultimate analysis, a certain
mind-set. Yet at the core of it and in its simplest form, democracy requires
(1) that people should have the right to choose those who rule them and
(2) the principle that the vote of each person should count as much as
another person's vote.
Note that globalization, almost by definition, means that nations and
people can exert a greater influence on other nations and the lives of citizens in other nations. Moreover, this power of one nation to influence
another is by no means symmetric. The U.S., for instance, can cut off virtually all the trade lines of Cuba. It can do so not only by curtailing its
own trade with Cuba but by threatening punitive action against those who
trade with or invest in Cuba. This is not just a hypothetical possibility; the
Helms-Burton Act in the U.S. is testimony to how this can actually happen. 3 1 Cuba, on the other hand, can do little to hurt the American economy or polity. Likewise, China can do things to Taiwan, which Taiwan can
in no way reciprocate.
As the world shrinks and powerful governments develop a variety of
instruments and ways to influence the lives of citizens in other nations, it is
no longer enough for people to be able to choose the leaders of their own
nations. Since transnational voting does, not happen (and even its hypothetical suggestion sounds absurd to us), globalization is bound to cause a
diminution of global democracy.
Thanks to globalization there are a variety of instruments that nations
can use to influence outcomes elsewhere. For the purposes of the current
essay the most important is the cessation of international trade, such as
would happen if the WTO were empowered to enforce ILS. International
trade (after a slow-down in the years between the two World Wars) has
risen steadily. These global linkages have fuelled unprecedented growth
rates of national incomes (during the 1990s China grew at around 8% per
annum and India 6.5%), but they have also created new vulnerabilities.
Governments and international organizations can now use the threat of
disrupting these flows (or the lure of releasing greater flows of money or
goods) to enforce conformity to certain kinds of behavior. And such
threats have been used. International organizations have given money
while insisting that the developing countries fulfill certain conditions,
many of which have had nothing to do with ensuring repayment. These
conditionalities have, at times, even been contradictory, such as requiring
the debtor nation to practice democracy and to privatize certain key sectors, unmindful of the fact that this may be against the collective wishes of
the people.
Some of these conditions have been blatantly in the interest of the
donor nation. In 1998, during the Asian crisis, the rescue package put
together with money from several industrialized nations, most prominently
31. 1have discussed the role and consequences of "triadic" threats in my PRELUDE TO
POLIcITAL ECONOMY: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMICS
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Japan and the U.S., had clauses that required Korea to lift bans on imports
of certain Japanese products (which Japan had long been trying to sell to
Korea) and to open up its banking sector to foreign banks (an item that had
long been on America's bilateral agenda with Korea). Some of these
demands may well be good for the borrower, but that is not the issue here.
From the point of view of assessing global democracy what is relevant is
that people of the weaker nation have very little say in the imposition of
these policies.
Given that the benefits of democracy are ample, as academic research
has shown and non-academics always knew, this erosion of global democracy must have negative fall-outs. Indeed, it is arguable that the rise in
global unrest and instabilities are a manifestation of this retreat of democracy. And the inchoate demands of the protestors in the streets of Seattle
and Washington may be founded in an intuitive but ill-articulated perception of this erosion of democracy.
What can be done about the erosion of global democracy? Utopian
schemes, such as a global government or a global bank that is answerable
to all nations in the world, are a distant dream. The process of globalization will course on, and inter-country democracy will continue to get
bruised. It will be some time before this can bring us to discussing global
governance and banking. In the mean time, what is open to us are small
measures, namely those of strengthening the democratic structure of global
institutions, such as the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO. These are
small measures, but extremely important.
Therefore, the appropriate measures are, ironically, quite different
from the dismantling of these organizations, which is what the protestors
in Seattle and Washington, and also some arch conservative groups in
industrialized nations, want. On the contrary, we need to restructure these
organizations and recognize that they have an especially important role to
play today. Of course there will be need for vigilance. There is enough
evidence that powerful politicians in powerful nations like to think of international institutions as valuable only to the extent that they can use them
to their own advantage.
On January 20, 2000, Senator Jesse Helms, arguably the most important congressional voice in the U.S., told the council members of the UN:
If the United Nations respects the sovereign rights of the American people,
and serves them as an effective tool of diplomacy, it will earn and deserve their
respect and support. But a United Nations that seeks to impose its presumed
for confrontaauthority on the American people, without their consent 3begs
2
tion and, I want to be candid, eventual U.S. withdrawal.
Helms went on to express distaste for "supranational institutions,"

including the international criminal court, which was created in 2000.
What is most damaging about this kind of remark is that any organization
that meets with Jesse Helms' approval immediately becomes suspect from
32. http://www.conservative.org/columnists/helms0120200O.htm (last visited Oct.
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the point of view of the world as a whole. The last thing that a credible
international organization will now want is Jesse Helms' blessing. A WTO
or a UN that has Helms' blessing and is entrusted with enforcing international labor and environmental standards will immediately be unacceptable to other nations, especially the developing countries whose interests
are often orthogonal to that of industrialized nations.
We need to work to give nations, rich and poor, equal say, at least in
international organizations that are supposed to play a mediating role in
world economics or international relations. This horizontal equity is violated in most organizations through at least one of two routes. First, there
is the open channel, which gives a larger share of votes to the nations contributing more to these organizations. This is certainly true of the IMF and
the World Bank. The second route is through the lack of transparency of
decision-making. One can see the importance of this for democracy by
looking at policy-making within a country. If the process of decision-making is visible to all, it becomes difficult for any group or lobby to hijack the
agenda. The same holds true for international organizations. Big and powerful nations, by virtue of contributing senior personnel and money to
these organizations have much greater access to them. If decisions occur
behind opaque walls powerful nations are much more able to divert the
agenda to suit their own interests. Take the case of the WTO. While it
does follow the important principle of one-country one-vote, it is widely
perceived as a preserve of powerful and rich nations. This is in part
because of what some analysts call the "green room" process, that is, what
goes on behind the scenes. 33 It is the green room where the agenda is set
and what is to appear on the table for all member nations to discuss and
vote on is determined. Many of the end results are determined at that
stage. If the WTO is to become a more democratic institution, it must not
allow its green room to be hijacked by a few.
This problem is nowhere more obvious than in the drafting of international labor standards. These are ostensibly designed in the interests of the
workers of developing countries. But the form that these standards are
tending to take-and the increasing talk of using trade sanctions to impose
these standards-is close to what protectionist lobbies in industrial nations
seek. This is not surprising given the greater access that the lobbies of rich
countries have in the corridors of power in international organizations.
Most sound surprised by this criticism of global institutions. The fact
that the questioning of the practice of richer nations (who contribute more
funds) exercising more voting power in these organizations sounds outrageous simply shows how far away we still are from global democracy. It
does not at all seem outrageous that Bill Gates does not have multiple votes
in the U.S. elections on the ground that he contributes more to government
coffers. In fact, the suggestion that he could have more votes sounds outra33. SeeJeffreyJ. Schott &Jayashree Watal, Decision Making in the WTO, in INSrTUT
WTO AFrER SEA=ELE, 283, 285-286 (Jeffrey J. Schott
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geous. This is because democracy within a nation is a much more settled
idea.
Fortunately, opinions change. Multi-nationals nowadays talk in terms
of environmental responsibility and the importance of respecting labor
standards, even when that implies taking a cut in profits. This seems to
violate age-old beliefs and also the textbook description of multinational
corporations. When the one-person one-vote idea first came about, the
rich feudal landlords must have been shocked and cried foul at this blatant
injustice and the chaos in the process of decision-making that this would
cause. But no longer does this democratic principle within a nation seem
strange.
Now, with the call for restructuring international organizations ringing out from the streets of Seattle and Washington and also congressional
committees, such as the commission headed by Allan Meltzer, 34 this is a
good time for us to think through some of these issues. We must consider
these issues not just from the point of view of economic efficiency and
greater cost effectiveness, but also from the point of view of representation
of the poor. It is only when we manage to make these changes in the structure of international organization that we will be able to entrust them with
important tasks such as monitoring labor and environmental standards
across the globe.

34. REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL

FINANCIAL INSTITUTION ADvISORY COMMISSION

(2000), available at http://www.house/gov/ec/imf/meltzer.pdf.

